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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

No. 9937

vs.

LARRY MYERS,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S

BRIEF

Appeal from the Judgment of the
2nd District Court for Weber County
Hon. John F. Wahlquist, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a prosecution brought by the State of Utah
against the defendant, charging him with violation of Section 76-53-15 (1), \\~herein the defendant was charged with
having sexual intercourse with a female under the age of
thirteen years of age.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From the verdict of the
jury of guilty and the sentence by the court to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison, the defendant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and the
grantin1g of a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant was charged with the crime of rape,
under Section 76-53-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The
defendant was charged with having sexual intercourse on
or about the 19th day of October, 1962, in Weber County,
State of Utah, with his daughter, Sherry Myers, age ten
years. The evidence adduced by the State at the trial con..
sisted of the testimony of the child, Sherry Myers, that on
several occasions during the months of September and
October of 1962, her father had forced her to engage in
acts of sexual intercourse with him. The State further introduced evidence by the testimony of Dr. Homer Rich,
a physician, who testified in substance that the girl lacked
a hymen1 and that the sexual parts were irritated and that
in his opinion she could have been penetrated, although
he did not indicate in his opinion whether or not she had
had sexual intercourse or not.
The defendant produced evidence to show, in1 addition
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to the denial of the defendant of any wrong doing, that
shortly before the alleged rape the child had received a
severe kick in the area of her sexual parts by a brother
of the child, and that she had been subjected to the
influence and pressure of relatives of the defendant to
secure her leaving the home of the defendant and living
elsewhere.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE COURT, IN EXCLUDING ALL WITNESSES, INCLUDING THE RELATIVES OF THE DEFENDANT, DENIED THE DEFENDANT A PUBLIC TRIAL.
Begnning on page 22 of the transcript in this matter,
the following remarks were made:
THE COURT: You may make your opening
statement.
MR. NEWEY: If it please, Your Honor, at this
time by reason of the age of Sherry Myers, our
proof will show that she is 10 years of age. By
reason of the nature of this crime, being that of
rape by reason of the relationship between the girl
and her father, we would move to exclude the public from the courtroom at all times during this trial,
including any persons.
MR. BINGHAM: Your Honor, may I approach
the bench before you rule on it. I would like to
make a suggestion.
Your Honor, could this be handled in the absence of the jury?
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THE COURT: Under the constitution~ the motion is denied with the exception of all who may be
witnesses. All persons who are interviewed as possible witnesses are to leave.
MR. BINGHAM: Your Honor, may I make
something a matter of record at this time?
THE COURT: Yes.
All persons who have been interviewed as possible witnesses, find a place for them.
BAILIFF: An~body that is going to be a witness, please step out.
THE COURT: You may keep one officer with
you if you want.
MR. BINGHAM: Your Honor, may I make this
motion at this time?
THE COURT: Come forward to the bench.
MR. BINGHAM: Your Honor, may the record
show that I approached the bench, and at this time
I indicated that I wanted to make a proffer to the
record as to the reasons for objecting to the court's
order, and that the court at this time indicated that
the objection would have to be made later?
THE COURT: Yes. The trial is to be open to
the public with the exception of the witnesses. They
may be called back when their presence is necessary for the testimony of the proceedings.
MR. BINGHAM: May the record further show,
Your Honor, that this is not the motion of the State,
no motion for this order was made?
T·HE COURT: The motion is by the State only.
MR. BINGHAM: The State didn't make this
.motion, Your Honor.
MR. NEWEY: Our original motion, Your Honor, was to exclude all persons from the courtroom,
and you denied that, I or assume you denied that.
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THE COURT: To the extent only. I will grant
it only as to the witnesses. If you want that, you
can have that. If you don't want it, they can come
back.
MR. NEWEY: We do desire that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, you may proceed.
Article 1, Section 12, of the Utah State Constitution
provides, as follows:
"In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel, ... to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases."
Title 78-7-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is a statute
which states the following:
"Right to exclude in certain cases - In an action of divorce, criminal conversation, seduction,
or abortion, rape, or assault with intent to commit
rape, the court may, in its discretion, exclude all
persons who are not directly interested therein,
except jurors, witnesses, and officers of the court;
and in any cause the court may, in its discretion,
during the examination of a witness exclude any
and all other witnesses in the cause."
It should be noted at the beginning that the motion
by the State for the exclusion of all of the public was made
on the basis of the nature of this case. It was stated to the
court that the motion was based on the age of the girl, age
10 years, the relat}onship of the girl and her father, and
the fact that it was a rape case. There was no motion to
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exclude witnesses until they had testified, nor was there
a motion made to exclude people from the courtroom based
upon any embarrassment of the young girl in the case.
The key people who were excluded by the order of the
court, as the roster of witnesses in the transcript shows,
were in fact the mother of the defendant, the grandmother
of U.te defendant, and other friends and relatives of the
defendant.
In State v. Jordan, 57 Utah 612, 196 P. 565, which was
a statutory rape trial, the court excluded all of the public
with the exception of witnesses. The court held that the
defendant had been denried a public trial within the purview of our constitution and stated the following:
"We cannot conceive of a case, no matter how
revolting and disgusting the details of the testimony given, in which the near relatives and friends
of the accused should not be permitted to be in attendance upon the trial for the purpose of seeing
that the accused is fairly and justly dealt with by
the officers of the court and not improperly
condemned.''
In State v. Beckstead, 96 Utah 528, 88 P.2d 461, which
was a carnal knowledge case, the State made a motion to
exclude the spectators from the courtroom. Objection was
made and over the objection the court made an order to
clear the courtroom with the exception of all witnesses.
The court in the Beckstead case discussed the implications
of Title 78-7-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and stated as
follows:
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"It will be observed that the part of this later
section, just quoted down to the semicolon following the word court, must relate to civil actions. All
of them except 'divorce' are actions in tort for
which recovery of dan1ages may be had and cannot
refer to criminal prosecutions without conflicting
with the constitution. That part of the section following the semicolon, relating to 'any cause' but in
the discretion of the court 'any cause' relates only
to the exclusion of 'any and all other witnesses in
the cause' and only during the examination of a
witness. This is what we think was intended by the
legislature and avoids any constitutional conflict.''
In the case of re: Oliver, 333 U.S. 272, 92 L. E. 693, 68
Supreme Court Reports 507, the court in citing State v.
Beckstead indicated with approval that it was error to
exclude friends and relatives of the accused from the trial
as was done in the instant case.
Likewise in People v. Byrnes, 192 P.2d 290, a California case, the defendant was charged with rape and sexual
perversion and was denied a public trial as guaranteed by
the Constitution where the sheriff was ordered to admit
to the courtroom only defendant's counsel, officers of the
court, jurors, and those having business with the court,
and excluding others and all witnesses except while on the
witness stand.
In the Byrnes case, the deputy district attorney, as in
the instant case, moved that the matter be heard behind
closed doors, which was objected to by the defendant. The
court went on to state with approval a rule as stated in
People v. Hardman, 37 P. 153, as follows:
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"The doors of the courtroom are expected to be
kept open, the public are entitled to be admitted.
The trial is to be public in all respects, as we have
before suggested, with due regard to the sizes of the
courtroom, the conveniences of the court, the right
to exclude objectionable characters and the youth
of tender years, and to do other things that may
facilitate the proper conduct of the trial."
There appears to be two lines of cases in connection
with the question of whether the defendant must show
that actual prejudice resulted from the exclusion by the
court of a part or all of the public. In State v. Jordan, 57
Utah 612, 186 P. 565, the court stated the majority rule
that the defendant having been denied a public trial within the scope of our Constitution, the law presumes that
the act of the court was prejudicial. Again in State v.
Beckstead our Supreme Court has stated:
"The error complained of in the exclusion order may seem technical. It is, however, fundamental. We are of the opinion that the order excluding
all spectators including friends and relatives of
the defendant was error. The Constitution of this
State, Section1 12, Article 1, provides, among other
things, that in criminal prosecutions that you shall
have the right to a speedy, public trial."
In People v. Byrnes the court again discussed the
question of actual prejudice and stated the majority rule
as follows:
"Appellant has not attempted to prove any actual prejudice resulted from the exclusion of the
public. The record shows no reason for the order,
other than the one stated by the court."
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The court went on in this case to state that there was
no actual threat of disturbance or disturbance of the proceedings of the trial, and that there appeared to be no
necessity for the exclusion order, and there being none the
order of the court was a clear deprivation of the defendant's right to a public trial.
In the instant case, the court later modified its order,
upon the withdrawal by the State of its motion, and allowed everyone to return to the courtroom.
In1 State v. Beckstead a similar occurrance took place
and our Supreme Court stated as follows:
"The fact that the order was later modified by
advising relatives that they might return and the
further fact that some of them did return could not
affect the consequences of the error. The original
order was carried out during a portion of the trial."
In State v. Hone, 224 P.2d 500, a Wyoming case, the
court excluded spectators at the request of the jury in a
rape case. To this the defendant objected. The court went
on to state that if the defendant had any special friends
that he wanted to have stay with him, that they would be
allowed to remain, but that the public would be excluded.
The court, in discussing a defendant's rights to a public
trial, stated with approval the rule from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 8th (8th ed.) page 647, as follows:
"The requirement of a public trial is for the
benefit of the accused; that the public may see he
is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned,
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and that the presence of spectators may keep his
triers, keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility
and to the importance of their function; and the
requirement is fairly observed if, without partiality
or favoritism, a reasonable proportion of the public
is suffered to attend, notwithstanding that those
persons whose presence could be of no service to
the accused, and who would be drawn thither by
a prurient curiosity or excluded altogether."
The court, in the Hone case, went on to state that it
felt there were enough people who were allowed to remain
in the courtroom to afford to the defendant a fair and public trial. In all of the cases wherein the matter was discussed, the courts have taken special interest in, and have
been1 greatly concerned that the defendant be allowed to
retain in the courtroom, friends and relatives. As was stated in State v. Smith, a Utah case, 67 P.2d 110, a statutory
rape case, the court stated:
"It is reasonably clear from the language used
that relatives and friends were not intended to be
excluded from the courtroom and there is no complaint that any such persons were in fact excluded."
The defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial
in connection with the manner in which the motion for an
order to exclude the public from the trial was brought to
the attention of the court. The motion was made by the
State of Utah, in the presence of the jury, and the defendant, upon objecting thereto, and desiring to discuss the
matter in the absence of the jury, was denied his request.
(See quoted portions of the transcript as set forth above.)
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•fhat the State's motion, requiring the defendant to argue
his desire for a public trial, in the presence of the jury, in
view of the nature of the case and the relationship of the
defendant and the prosecuting witness, could not but have
placed the defendant in an unfavorable and prejudicial
light in the eyes of the jury.
POI NT II
1

THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL BASED UPON
DETECTIVE TIM DYER'S TESTIMONY ON CROSS
EXAMINATION.

During the opening statement of the district attorney,
the following statement was made at page 29 of the
transcript:
"We will call Officer Dyer who will briefly tell
you that when this defendant was charged with the
crime of rape and was advised that he was charged
with the crime of rape, that instead of the defendant turning and denying it as a father would ... "
That during the cross examination of the said Tim
Dyer by defendant's attorney, the following testimony
was given at page 96:

Q Were you present here in court when Mr.
Newey gave his opening statement to the jury?
A No. I was barred from the courtroom.
Q I see. Now, is it true that Mr. Myers didn't
deny the charge of rape?
A What was this again?
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Q Did Mr. Myers deny to you that he was
guilty of rape; yes or no?
A I don't get your question. Would you repeat it again?
Q When' a man is arrested and charged with
a crime, the officer asks him if he is guilty of this
thing. You do this, don't you?
A On this case or other cases?
Q

On any case, when you arrest a man of a

crime, you ask him if he is guilty or innocent,
d-on't you? Did you do it or didn't you?
A No. We don't ask a fellow if he is guilty or
innocent, no.

Q Do you mean to tell me if I got arrested
for a charge like this you wouldn't ask me if I did
it?
A I didn't ask him if he did it.
Is it your testimony under oath that you
didn't ask Larry Myers if he committed this offense
or not?
A That's right. I didn't ask him that.
Q

Is it your testimony that that is standard
police procedure not to ask an accused person if
he did the offense that he is charged with?
A Now, state that question again, please. I
don't get what the question is.
Q

Q Is it my understanding that it is standard
police procedure when you arrest a person not to
ask him whether he has done the offense that he is
charged with?
A It all depends on whether you have other
cases with this person or not. We know him pretty
well.
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Later in the cross examination he was asked, page 96,
if he knew of any offense that Mr. Myers was guilty of. His
answer was, as indicated by the record, "no response." On
page 197 of the transcript, the court, in denying the motion
for a mistrial, indicated that the answers given by the officer were fairly made in response to the questions asked.
In a sex offense, particularly one in which a father is
accused of having sexual intercourse with his ten year old
child, the remarks of a police officer in answer to questions
that imply the defendant is a man "It all depends on
\Vhether you have other cases with this person or not. We
know him pretty well," can easily paint a picture in the
minds of a juror that here is a defendant who has a police
record of sex offenses or at least of other offenses. Especially in view of the fact, when challenged specifically, Officer
Dyer could state no crime of any nature this man was
guilty of. If this were not a sex offen1se of the particular
type described, the prejudice arising may be slight; but in
this particular instance, and in the context in which the
answer was given, the results could not but have prejudiced the defendant in the minds of the jurors who heard
the answer given. The testimon~ quoted above indicates
clearly an~ attempt by the officer to support the district
attorney's opening remarks, and to evade stating the
truth. That the defendant had, as admitted later in the
testimony of the officer, denied his guilt strongly.
It should be noted that immediately after the testimony complained of above, the defendant's attorney requested that the jury be excused and a matter discussed
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in its absence. This motion was denied by the court, as
recorded on the bottom of page 97. The purpose in making
the motion, was to attempt to correct or remove, immediately, and not in the presence of the jury, the prejudice
that the defendant contends the remarks caused.
POINT III
THATTHECOURTERREDINREMARKSMADEDU~

ING THE TRIAL, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY,
THAT AMOUNTED TO A PREJUDICIAL COMMENT
UPON THE EVIDENCE BY THE COURT.
The transcript will indicate it was the contention of
the defendant during the trial that the accusation made
by his daughter was based upon the influence of other
relatives who desire to secure custody of the girl. The
transcript will further indicate that the person alleged by
the defendant to be primarily responsible for the girl making the accusation was one Freda, sworn Aunt Freda. At
page 75 of the transcript, upon cross examination of the
complaintant, Sherry Myers, the following testimony was
given:

Q (By attorney for defendant.) In fact, before
you answer my questions, you look at Freda, don't
you?
A Yes.
Q Why?
A I don't know.
THE COURT: The record may show that counsel stands between Aunt Freda and the witness.
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Q May the record show that I asked her if
she was looking at Aunt Freda?
TilE COURT: Yes.
During the cross examination of the defendant's mother, Mary Heath, the district attorney asked permission to
approach the bench and after a bench conference, the court
made the following statement to the jury, without solicitation by either side, as revealed on page 135 of the
transcript.

THE COURT: The record may show there has
been an injection which might tend to bear upon
this woman's mental capacity and the court has
ruled that you may ask. You may proceed.
The district attorney was then allowed to ask the
\Vitness if she suffered from hallucinations, and to go into
detail upon cross examination as to her psychiatric treatments, and hospitalizations, etc.
The contention of the defendant that Aunt F'reda had
encouraged the child to make accusations against her
father was primarily substantiated by the testimony of
~tary Heath. The court's comment that question of her
1nental capacity had been raised and that the State could
go into the matter, was a comment upon the weight that
the jury should give to this witness' testimony, which only
the finder of fact should make.
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POINT IV
THAT THE ERRORS O·F THE COURT ARE CUMULATIVE, AND WHEN VIEWED IN CONNE·CTION WITH
EACH OTHER, RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO THIS
DEFENDANT.

Aside from the contention that the defendant was
denied a public trial by the court's excluding from the
courtroom witnesses during a portion of the trial, there
remains the other points heretofore argued. The refusal of
the court to grant a mistrial based upon the testimony of
Officer Dyer, and the remarks of the court commenting
upon the evidence offered by the defendant's mother, Mary
Heath.
The picture which was painted by the State, through
remarks made, and orders entered, by the court, was to
suggest to the jury that the defendant was the son of an
emotionally and mentally ill person, had an extensive
police record, and was well known to the police department. The fact that the Officer admitted he knew of no
crimes the defendant was guilty of could not lessen, but
slightly, the impact of his testimony.
The court has often1 stated that the charge of rape is
one that is easily made and is hard to disprove. In this
case the father is accused of raping his ten year old daughter. The accusation alone imparts a prejudice to a defendant. The sentence to be meted out by our statute of from
twenty years to life indicates the gravity of the charge.
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Casual remarks by the court, or from a prosecution
witness, may in other cases impart little damage. In this
case, however, the remarks complained of are such, it is
respectfully submitted, that could not help but stoke the
fires of prejudice and revulsion that the very nature of
the charge ignite in most jurors' minds.

CONCLUSION
That the conviction of this defendant should be reversed in that he was deprived of a fair, orderly, public
trial. That improper evidence was received and that said
evidence and the remarks of the court prejudiced the defendant in the eyes of the jury.
Respectfully submitted,

L. G. BINGHAM
1001 First Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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